Publication on gender differences in local governments and political budget cycles

Incumbent politicians may seek to influence voter perceptions of their competence and/or preferences by means of fiscal policy. Such election-induced fiscal policy cycles are known as “political budget cycles”. In a new study, Israel García and Bernd Hayo investigate the effect of gender differences in the composition of local governments on political budget cycles. Using a sample of Spanish municipalities from the Madrid region for the period 2010–2019, the study distinguishes budget expenditure items as either “mandatory” or “non‐mandatory” public services. The impact of gender differences is studied along two dimensions: the mayor's sex and the share of women in government. Moreover, the study analyzes regional differences by distinguishing between smaller and larger municipalities.

The study offers two key findings on political budget cycles:
1. In smaller municipalities, a female mayor in combination with a gender-balanced government increases spending on mandatory expenditures by almost 10% of total spending in election years, compared to male-dominated governments.
2. In larger municipalities, a female mayor in combination with a female-dominated government (i.e., when the share of women is above 60%) increases mandatory spending by up to 10%, and non-mandatory spending by up to 2.2%. These findings are generally supported in a mixed-gender close election analysis.

The corresponding article has been published as: García, I, and Hayo, B. (2025). The influence of politicians’ sex on political budget cycles: an empirical analysis of Spanish municipalities. Economics & Politics, 37, 243–270.

Link to the article: https://doi.org/10.1111/ecpo.12318

Contact: Dr. Israel García Dominguez